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Comments I
Once More Unto the Breach!-the
Judicial Assault on Student-Initiated
Prayer at Graduation Ceremonies
His worst fault is that he is given to prayer; he is something
peevish that way.
Shakespeare, Merry Wives of Windsor, i,4,13
In 1961, the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. gave a
commencement address to the graduating class of Lincoln
University. In this address, Dr. King outlined his vision for a new
paradigm of justice and race relations in an integrated America. He
exhorted students to become active in the struggle for equality and
civil rights. Within his speech, he made numerous references to his
Christian faith and the Christian deity. In concluding the address,
Dr. King used the same words that were later made famous in the
1963 March on Washington "I Have A Dream" speech: "That will
be the day when all of God's children, black men and white men,
Jews and Gentiles, Catholics and Protestants, will be able to join
hands and sing in the words of the old Negro spiritual, "Free at last!
Free at last! Thank God Almighty, we are free at last!"'
1. Martin Luther King, Jr., Commencement Address, Lincoln University,
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If my former high school were to permit a student speaker to
recite Dr. King's words and exhortations in an invocation at the
Class of 2001 graduation ceremonies, and the invocation were
challenged in federal court as violative of the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals would
likely issue an injunction prohibiting the student from giving this
address.
Public school officials and school boards continue to wrestle
with the issue of ceremonial prayer and invocations at high school
graduation ceremonies. Since the 1992 Supreme Court decision in
Lee v. Weisman,2 which held a religious invocation delivered by a
rabbi at the behest of school officials at a public school graduation
ceremony unconstitutional, school districts across the country have
struggled to define new policies respecting both the dictates of the
law, and the religious traditions of students and their communities.
Critics of ceremonial prayer argue that attempts by schools to
draft new policies in response to Lee are simply attempts to
circumvent the new rulings and permit unconstitutional practices to
continue. Proponents of such expression believe that the
ceremonial nature of the prayer, together with the Free Speech and
Free Exercise rights of student speakers, require the continuation
of these practices.
The courts have not been helpful in this process, failing to
articulate clear standards to be used by schools in permitting or
forbidding student-led invocations. Some courts would prohibit the
practice altogether; others would require a neutral selection process
for choosing student speakers rather than one by majoritarian
election; others require that the content of the student's remarks be
nonsectarian and nonproselytizing; still other courts require that
there be no explicit discussion purpose of prayer or religious
expression by school officials as they draft and adopt new policies.
With such confusion and contradiction abounding, what is a school
district which truly seeks to be in conformity with the law to do?
This paper will trace the current debate in the federal Courts
of Appeals on the issue of student-initiated, student-led prayer at
graduation ceremonies, and prescribe new guidelines, consistent
with the rulings of the various courts, which can be adopted by
school officials as they prepare for this year's graduation
ceremonies. Part I of the article summarizes the historical
(June 6, 1961) (cited in United States Supreme Court Petitioner's Brief, Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)).
2. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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background of the Establishment Clause, the contemporary
practices of the Founders, and the role of religion in American
society. Part II presents the current debate over Establishment
Clause jurisprudence and introduces the tests currently used by the
Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals. Part III traces the
evolution of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause juris-
prudence vis-A-vis public schools. Part IV discusses the seminal Lee
v. Weisman decision, and attempts by Courts of Appeals to craft a
coherent jurisprudence concerning student-led prayer at graduation
ceremonies in light of Lee. Part V discusses the fundamental
principles underlying the Courts of Appeals cases, and proposes
guidelines for school districts to formulate policies concerning
student-led invocations, while respecting the constitutional limits of
such practices under the Establishment Clause.
I. The Role of Religion in the United States
I say that the real and permanent grandeur of these States must be
their religion.
Walt Whitman, "Starting from Paumanok"
A. The Founders
During the formation of the Republic, the Founders had the
foresight to recognize that the freedoms represented in the
Constitution were best secured in a nation and a system of laws
which respected differences, tolerated dissent, and encouraged full
and equal participation by citizens. Yet the Founding Fathers were
a deeply religious group, who cherished their personally-held
religious convictions. In response to the limitations of individual
freedom of religious expression in England, the Founders
recognized that paramount to the securing of freedom in a State
was the protection of an individual's religious freedom and the
corporate freedom of religious expression.
An element of this freedom of expression is the role
ceremonial prayer and religious expression have played throughout
United States history. Public officials from the time of the
Founders have given voice to America's religious traditions by
including prayer and religious expression in public ceremonies. As
Justice Scalia noted in Lee v. Weisman: "The history and tradition
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of our Nation are replete with public ceremonies featuring prayers
of thanksgiving and petition.,
3
The Declaration of Independence included explicit religious
references to "the Supreme Judge" and asserted the signers' "firm
reliance on the protection of divine Providence" in order to both
give expression to their convictions and to provide moral authority
for their cause . In his first inaugural address, after reciting his
Oath of Office on a Bible, President George Washington inten-
tionally included prayer as "a part of his first official act as
President."5  Since the first inaugural, ceremonial prayers and
explicit expressions of religious belief have been commonplace in
subsequent Presidential Inaugural addresses, including those of
Framers Adams, Jefferson and Madison.6
Presidents have also issued Presidential decrees for the stated
purpose of national days of prayer.7 The day following the
adoption of the Establishment Clause by the House of
Representatives, the House adopted a resolution requesting
President Washington to "proclaim a day of public thanksgiving
and prayer, to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts
the many and signal favours of Almighty God.",8  President
Washington responded by declaring November 26, 1789 a national
day of thanksgiving in which to "humbly [offer] prayers and
supplications" to "that great and glorious Being who is the
beneficent author of all the good that was" and "the great Lord and
Ruler of Nations." 9 Presidents John Adams and James Madison
and almost every subsequent President have followed Washington's
example and issued Thanksgiving Proclamations."°
3. Id. at 633 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
4. See id.
5. Id. President Washington's inaugural address included the following: "It
would be peculiarly improper to omit in this first official act my fervent
supplications to that Almighty Being who rules over the universe, who presides in
the councils of nations, and whose providential aids can supply every human
defect, that His benediction may consecrate to the liberties and happiness of the
people of the United States a Government instituted by themselves for these
essential purposes." Id. (quoting INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES, 2 (1989)).
6. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 633-34.
7. See Wallace v. Jaffee, 472 U.S. 38, 98 (Renhquist, J., dissenting).
8. See id. (quoting 1 J. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, 64 (1897)).
9. See id.
10. See id. at 102 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). President Thomas Jefferson did
not issue a Thanksgiving Proclamation, as he felt it an improper role of the
President and government to dictate to individuals "the times for these exercises,
and the objects proper for them." Id. at 103 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 11
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The historical tradition of ceremonial prayer at public events is
not limited to the Executive Branch. The First Congress adopted
the policy of opening daily sessions of the House and Senate with
prayers offered by official chaplains." The Supreme Court has
opened sessions since the time of Chief Justice Marshall with the
invocation "God save the United States and this Honorable
Court."12
While critics may argue that the ceremonial practices of the
Founders have little bearing on the contemporary coercive nature
of majoritarian religious expression in a pluralistic and multicultural
United States, it is clear that the Founders viewed religious
expression and ceremonial prayer not only as permissible under the
Establishment Clause, but also as an integral element of our
identity as a nation respecting and giving expression to religious
liberty.
B. Religion in Contemporary America
The role of religion has long been recognized as exerting
tremendous influence in the political and social mosaic of America.
From the time of the Founding Fathers until today, when over
ninety-four percent of Americans believe in the existence of God or
some type of supreme being, religious expression has been a
hallmark of American society.'3 Alexis DeTocqueville commented
on the religious nature of the American people in Democracy in
America, noting it as "the first thing that struck my attention." 14
While many contemporary observers believe that religion has
lost its preeminent role in American society, surveys reveal that
levels of expressed religious belief remain "extraordinarily high."'5
With over 500,000 churches, temples and mosques representing
over 2,000 religious sects in the United States, over seventy percent
of Americans claim membership in a church or similar religious
organization.'6 Sixty percent of Americans claim to attend religious
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 429 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904)).
11. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787-88 (1983). James Madison was
among those members appointed by the House to propose an appropriate chaplain
practice, and voted in favor of the bill authorizing it. See id. at 788, n.8.
12. Lee, 505 U.S. at 635 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
13. George Gallup, Jr., Religion in America (Visited January 19, 1999)
http://www.usia.gov/journals/itsv/0397/ijse/gallup.htm.
14. ALEXIS DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, ch. 17. (Visited Jan.
19,2000) http://xroads.virginia.edu/-HYPER/DETOC/religion/chl_17.htm.
15. Gallup, supra note 13.
16. See id.
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services at least monthly, while forty percent attend religious
services weekly.17
The primacy of religion in American society also has
significant implications for volunteerism and charitable giving.18
Almost half of the church members did unpaid volunteer work in a
given year, compared to only a third of non-members. 9 Ninety-two
percent of those espousing religious affiliation gave money to a
charity, compared to only seventy-one percent of non-adherents. 2°
Seventy-eight percent gave goods, clothing or other property to a
charitable organization, compared to sixty-six percent of non-
members.2' Religious organizations have consistently drawn more
money than all other voluntary associations combined.22
Prayer continues to be a hallmark of religious expression in the
United States as well. A recent Gallup Poll reported that 9 in 10
Americans engage in prayer, a percentage "that has not changed
over the last half-century., 23  So prevalent is the practice that
seventy-five percent of Americans claim to pray on a daily basis. 4
The widespread acceptance and practice of prayer influences the
public's perception of role religious expression should play in public
schools: over seventy percent of Americans favor allowing daily
spoken prayers in public school, and eighty-three percent are in
favor of allowing students to say prayers as an official part of
graduation ceremonies.25
Far from being relegated to the back bench of American life,
private and corporate religious expression continue to be fund-
amental to the fabric of American character. As DeTocqueville
observed in Democracy in America: "Religion in America takes no
direct part in the government of society, but it must be regarded as
the first of their political institutions., 26 As a result of the pervasive
presence and influence of religious groups and religious expression,
interaction and conflict with the modern state is inevitable. The




20. See Gallup, supra note 13.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. Gallup Poll, As Nation Observes National Day of Prayer (Visited January
13, 1999) http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr990506.asp.
24. See id.
25. Gallup Poll, Most Americans Support Prayer in Public Schools (Visited
January 13, 1999) http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr990709.asp.
26. DETOCQUEVILLE, supra note 14.
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respecting the limits of the Establishment Clause while continuing
to recognize the important role religion plays in modern America.
II. Reconciling the Clauses
Our greatest object in the construction of the state is the greatest
happiness of the whole, and not that of any one class.
Plato, The Republic, Bk. iv, s.1.
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion."27 The First Amendment also guarantees-in the Free
Exercise Clause-that Congress shall make no law "prohibiting the
free exercise" of religion." In Everson v. Board of Education, the
Court stated: "The First Amendment has erected a wall [of
separation] between church and state. That wall must be kept high
and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach.,
29
Yet as Justice Douglas in Zorach v. Clauson stated, "We are a
religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.,
30
Given this seeming contradiction between the Establishment and
Free Exercise clauses, a troublesome dichotomy has arisen over the
courts' definition of the relationship between government and
religion.
Although religion plays this vital role in American society, the
courts have had difficulty in determining religion's role vis-A-vis the
state. There exists a fundamental conflict between the courts'
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause doctrines.
According to the Court, these clauses are "cast in absolute terms,
and either[,]... if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to
clash with the other."'" The tension between the clauses can be
traced to the Court's controversial decision in Everson v. Board of
Education, with its rigid formulation of Establishment Clause
standards:
The establishment of religion clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: neither a state nor the federal government
can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
27. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
28. Id.
29. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
30. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
31. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).
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another. .. No person can be punished for entertaining or
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance
or non-attendance. No tax, in any amount, can be levied to
support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion. Neither a state nor the federal government
can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious
organizations or groups and vice versa. 
3 2
The Establishment Clause doctrine must compete and often
conflict with the Court's Free Exercise standards.33 However, it is
not clear when one or the other determination is to be used, or
what limits are to guide its application. As one commentator states:
"the Court's separate tests for the Religion clauses have provided
virtually no guidance for determining when an accommodation for
religion, seemingly required under the Free Exercise Clause,
constitutes impermissible aid to religion under the Establishment
Clause."'3'
A. Accommodation v. Separation
Since Everson, two primary interpretations of the Establish-
ment Clause have arisen: accommodation and separation. 5
Separationists allude to Jefferson's "wall of separation" metaphor. 6
32. Everson, 330 U.S. at 10.
33. The Free Exercise standard balances the government interest in achieving
its policy or regulatory objectives against the right of the citizen in pursuing his
religious expression free from government intervention. The state may only
intrude upon this right if it is in the "highest order" of state interest. See Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
34. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the
Conflict, 41 U. PITr. L. REV. 673 (1980).
35. Developments In The Law-Religion And The State, Free Exercise
Accommodation of Religion, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1703, 1719 (1987).
36. The continued use of Jefferson's "wall of separation" metaphor as the
basis for Establishment Clause theory is not without its critics, however. As
Justice Rehnquist explained in Wallace v. Jaffree:
The Establishment Clause has been expressly freighted with Jefferson's
misleading metaphor for nearly forty years. Thomas Jefferson was of
course in France at the time the constitutional amendments known as the
Bill of Rights were passed by Congress and ratified by the states. His
letter to the Danbury Baptist Association was a short note of courtesy,
written fourteen years after the Amendments were passed by Congress.
He would seem to any detached observer as a less than ideal source of
contemporary history as to the meaning of the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment.
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Former Chief Justice Burger
has also been critical of the metaphor. In his majority opinion in Lemon v.
Kurzman, he stated: "[We] must recognize that the line of separation, far from
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They argue that the Establishment Clause prohibits both govern-
ment preference between religions and government preference for
religion over non-religion, requiring both government and religion
to occupy strictly autonomous spheres.37  Separationists also
emphasize the importance of avoiding excessive government
entanglement with religion, whether administrative or symbolic.38
They reconcile the Religioij clauses by restricting all manner of
religion expression from the public realm.39
However, given the growth and increasing complexity of the
modern regulatory and administrative state, it has become virtually
impossible for the state to maintain complete separation from
religion.' As Chief Justice Burger stated in Lynch v. Donnelly:
"[The] concept of a 'wall' of separation is a useful figure of
speech.., but the metaphor itself is not a wholly accurate
description of the practical aspect of the relationship that in fact
exists between church and state."41 Separationism, while useful in
theory to guide the application of Court doctrine, often is an
impractical vehicle by which to effect First Amendment principles.
Accommodationists argue that the First Amendment was
intended to prevent government from supporting or showing
preference to one sect over another, and was not intended to forbid
neutral government support of religious pluralism.42 They contend
that the support of religion is not only permitted by the Religion
clauses, but that accommodation is required by the Free Exercise
Clause. 3 Not permitting government to accommodate religious
interests, accommodationists argue, shows a "callous indifference"
towards religion, one neither intended nor supported by the
Religion Clauses.' However, in an American society marked by
increasing secularization and religious and cultural pluralism,
potential state accommodation of a particular religion over other
being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the
circumstances of a particular relationship." Lemon v. Kurzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971).
37. See Free Exercise Accommodation of Religion, supra note 35, at 1719-21.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614 (1971) ("[O]ur prior holdings do not call for total
separation between church and state; total separation is not possible in an absolute
sense... some relationship between government and religious organizations is
inevitable").
41. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
42. See Free Exercise Accommodation of Religion, supra note 35, at 1713.
43. See id. at 1712-14.
44. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314.
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sects or over non-religion could raise both Establishment Clause
and Equal Protection concerns.
Widespread dissatisfaction exists with this tenuous dichotomy.
Establishment and Free Exercise clause doctrines have reached a
deadlock. These doctrines have developed separately, and seem to
conflict in their theoretical bases and practical legal outcomes.
Though arguably written to protect the same values, these clauses
were intended to complement each other in defining the
relationship between state and the protection of individual religious
liberty. Instead, cases are more often being decided by the
exclusive application of the judicial standards of one clause or the
other, with the result of a case depending upon the classification of
the claim as either an establishment or free exercise challenge. As
Justice Kennedy stated in County of Allegheny v. American Civil
Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter: "Substantial revision of
our Establishment Clause doctrine may be in order."45
B. Establishment Clause Tests
The Supreme Court has employed four tests in examining
Establishment Clause challenges to state action since the early
1970's. These tests are: 1.) the Lemon test; 2.) the historical
precedent test of Marsh v. Chambers; 3.) Justice O'Connor's
endorsement test; and 4.) Justice Kennedy's coercion test.
1. The Lemon Test-In an attempt to give uniformity to the
Court's Establishment Clause doctrine, the Supreme Court
proposed a new three-pronged test in Lemon v. Kurzman.46 Chief
Justice Burger, writing for the Court, outlined a three-prong
Establishment Clause analysis that a challenged government action
or statute must satisfy, which has since been called the "Lemon
test. ,47
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose.4 The
secular purpose prong of the Lemon test requires that there be no
evidence in a statute's legislative history of a stated purpose to
45. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,656 (1989) (Kennedy, J. dissenting).
46. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602.
47. See id. In Lemon, the Court struck down a Rhode Island statute providing
for a fifteen percent salary supplement for teachers instructing in sectarian schools,
and a Pennsylvania statute authorizing the state to provide financial assistance to
defray the costs incurred by private schools in teaching secular subjects. See id. at
607-10.
48. See id. at 612-13.
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advance or promote religion through the machinery of the state.49
Second, its principal or primary effect must neither advance nor
inhibit religion.0 Third, the statute must not foster an excessive
government entanglement with religion."
The three prongs of the Lemon test are not without precedent.
In School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, which
invalidated a Pennsylvania statute requiring the reading of Bible
verses at the beginning of school, Justice Clark proposed a new test
for the Establishment Clause. He stated that the statute in question
should have a secular purpose, and that the primary effect of such a
statute should neither aid nor inhibit religion. 2 In Walz v. Tax
Commission, upholding a government grant of tax exemption for
property used for religious purposes, the Court added a third test,
stating that the Establishment Clause forbids the state to become
excessively entangled with religion. 3 The Court later synthesized
these separate elements into the Lemon test. Though roundly
criticized, the Lemon test continues to guide the Court in its
analysis of Establishment Clause cases.
2. Historical Precedent Test-"The true meaning of the
Establishment Clause can only be seen in its history."54 While there
exists much debate over the proper place of historical analysis in
contemporary Establishment challenges, the starting point for any
Establishment Clause analysis remains in the writings, debates and
contemporary practices of the Framers.
While not bound to literal interpretations of the Constitution
based on the prevailing circumstances, the Court nevertheless
examines this historical record closely for insight into the intent of
the Framers. For certain Establishment Clause challenges, this
process becomes not merely illustrative, but dispositive.
In Marsh v. Chambers, the practice of a state legislature
opening legislative sessions with prayer offered by a state-paid
49. The application of this prong does not examine the subjective motivations
of legislators; the mere presence of religious beliefs and motivations held by
individual legislators does not serve to invalidate an otherwise valid practice. See
Bd. of Educ. of Westside Community Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249 (1990)
("Even if some legislators were motivated by a conviction that religious speech in
particular was valuable and worthy of protection, that alone would not invalidate
the Act because what is relevant is the legislative purpose of the statute, not the
possibly religious motives of the legislators who enacted the law.").
50. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
51. See id.
52. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
53. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
54. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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chaplain was upheld.5 As the Court noted, "historical evidence
sheds light not only on what the draftsmen intended the
Establishment Clause to mean, but also on how they thought that
Clause applied.., their actions reveal their intent."56 While a bare
5-4 majority upheld the Marsh practice based on the historical
precedent analysis, this reasoning has not been adopted by a
majority in any Establishment Clause case involving the interplay
between religion and public schools.
History gives little insight into the view of the Framers
concerning the Establishment Clause and public education. The
Supreme Court has often noted the relatively short history of public
schools in declining to apply a historical analysis in the context of
religion in public schools: "[A] historical approach is not useful in
determining the proper roles of church and state in public schools,
since free public education was virtually non-existent at the time
the Constitution was adopted."57 Justice O'Connor echoed this in
her concurrence in Wallace v. Jaffree: ".... free public education
was virtually non-existent in the late 18th century. Since there then
existed few government-run schools, it is unlikely that the persons
who drafted the First Amendment... anticipated the problems of
interaction of church and state in the public schools."' 8 Thus, in
such Establishment Clause cases, while the historical precedent is
closely examined, it is rarely itself dispositive of an issue.
3. Justice O'Connor's Endorsement Test-Desiring to
clarify the confusion surrounding the Lemon test and Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and recognizing the need for a
predictable and uniform Establishment Clause standard, Justice
O'Connor proposed an alternative test in her concurrence in Lynch
v. Donnelly.59 Under O'Connor's endorsement test, a court would
ask whether the government action conveys support or
endorsement of a sect or religion to the public, particularly to non-
adherents. 0
Justice O'Connor's alternative test asks three questions: 1.)
whether the government intends to convey a message of
55. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
56. Id. at 790.
57. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 n.4 (1987).
58. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 80 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
59. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Commentators
have applauded Justice O'Connor's alternative test. In a footnote to his
concurrence in Allegheny v. ACLU, Justice Stevens alludes to the more than
"sixteen articles and one book lauding the test." See Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
at 650 n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring).
60. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690-93.
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endorsement of religion; 2.) whether the government does in fact
convey a message of endorsement; and 3.) whether there is an
excessive entanglement between government and religion, which
might give an advantage to religious adherents to "access to
government or governmental powers not fully shared by non-
adherents of the religion.,
61
In refocusing the emphasis of the Establishment Clause on the
perspective of the non-adherent and the impact of government
action upon his beliefs, O'Connor's endorsement test would allow
Supreme Court doctrine to be applied to Establishment Clause
cases with sufficient sensitivity to non-adherents, while not
invalidating every interaction between the state and religious
communities.62 As O'Connor summarizes: "The Establishment
Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a religion
relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political
community... Endorsement sends a message to non-adherents that
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community.,
63
While Lemon prohibits any form of government-religion inter-
action which advances religion, O'Connor's endorsement test
would forbid only those acts which would be reasonably perceived
by the public as approval and endorsement of a religious point of
view.'
An additional advantage of O'Connor's endorsement test lies
in changing the nature of inquiry about legislative intent. By
abandoning the Lemon test's requirement of a secular intent and
replacing it with a requirement of non-endorsement of religion, the
endorsement test would allow proper deference to the legislature in
absence of an intent to endorse religion.65 As Justice O'Connor
stated in Wallace v. Jaffree: "The endorsement test does not
preclude government from acknowledging religion or from taking
religion into account in making law and policy."66
4. Justice Kennedy's Coercion Test-Not satisfied with the
proposition that every government act which advances religion
under the Lemon framework or endorses religion based upon the
subjective appreciation of non-adherents should be rendered
unconstitutional, Justice Kennedy proposed an alternative
61. See id. at 688.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 687-88.
64. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-88.
65. See Bd. of Educ. of Westside Community Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,
250-51 (1990).
66. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 80 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Establishment Clause analysis in Lee v. Weisman.67 This standard is
based upon the potential coercive nature of state action vis-A-vis
non-adherents. 6
Examining the Court's early Establishment Clause cases,
Kennedy finds the threshold issue to be the presence or absence of
coercion by the state.69 Where state coercion is present, there is a
clear Establishment Clause violation.7" Absent evidence of
coercion to non-adherents, the state may accommodate the
religious expression of citizens because the "risk of infringement of
religious liberty... is minimal."'" Kennedy adds: "Noncoercive
government action within the realm of flexible accommodation or
passive acknowledgment... does not violate the Establishment
Clause. ,72
Justice Kennedy would limit the application of the
Establishment Clause to those cases in which the government gave
"direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact
'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.""'
Because of the "central role religion plays in our society," coupled
with the "pervasive" nature of the modern "administrative state,"
Kennedy believes that the government must be given some
"latitude" in recognizing and accommodating this role.74 Were this
latitude not afforded government action by the judiciary, Kennedy
states, the result would be akin to "latent hostility towards
religion."75
67. Justice Kennedy first discussed the coercion analysis in his dissenting
opinion in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater
Pittsburgh Chapter. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
68. See id.
69. See id. at 659 ("Our cases disclose two limiting principles: government may
not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise; and it
may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give direct
benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact "establishes a [state] religion or
religious faith, or tends to do so.").
70. See id. Justice Kennedy cites a number of examples of unconstitutional
state coercion: "Forbidden involvements include compelling or coercing
participation or attendance at a religious activity, requiring religious oaths to
obtain government office or benefits, or delegating government power to religious
groups." Id. at 660. (internal cites omitted).
71. Id. at 662.
72. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 662 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 659.
74. Id. at 657-68 ("Rather than requiring government to avoid any action that
acknowledges or aids religion, the Establishment Clause permits government some
latitude in recognizing and accommodating the central role religion plays in our
society.").
75. Id. at 657.
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III. Establishment Clause Jurisprudence-Historical Background
Who hearkens to the gods, the gods give ear.
Homer, Iliad, Bk. xvi, l. 249.
While potential Establishment Clause conflicts involving state
action and religion have become more commonplace in the years of
the modern Supreme Court, such cases were once rare. In 1947, the
modern Supreme Court heard its first major Establishment Clause
case. In deciding Everson v. Board of Education, the Court ruled
that a New Jersey statute authorizing the transportation of students
to parochial schools and the reimbursement of transportation costs
to their parents violated the Establishment Clause.76 The Court, in
striking down the statute, held that the First Amendment was
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.77 Justice
Black, writing for the majority, emphasized that the Establishment
Clause was intended to create a wall of separation between church
and state, adding that the wall should be kept "high and
impregnable."78
In the years immediately following Everson, the Court decided
two Establishment Clause cases involving the permissible role of
religion in public schools. In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of
Education, the Court held that a state program giving religious
groups access to public school classrooms for religious instruction
violated the Establishment Clause.79 In an 8-1 decision, the Court
held that the level of involvement had reached beyond permissible
heights and was therefore unconstitutional. Justice Black, writing
for the majority, stated that the constitutionally-required separation
between religion and the state was violated by the "use of tax-
supported property for religious instruction and the close
cooperation between the school authorities and the religious
council in promoting religious education."'  The public school's
entanglement with religion was "beyond all question a utilization of
the tax-established.., public school system to aid religious groups
to spread their faith."'81 Justice Black concluded that "[n]either a
state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
76. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
77. Id. at 15.
78. Id. at 18.
79. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
80. Id. at 209.
81. Id. at 210.
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participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups,
and vice versa.,
82
Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion, cited the unique
role of public education and public schools in American democracy
as a further requirement of upholding a strict separation between
the public schools and organized religion: "The public school is at
once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means
for promoting our common destiny. In no activity of the State is it
more vital to keep out divisive forces than in its schools, to avoid
confusing, not to say fusing, what the Constitution sought to keep
strictly apart. '' 3 He added, "The sharp confinement of the public
schools to secular education was a recognition of the need of a
democratic society to educate its children, insofar as the State
undertook to do so, in an atmosphere free from pressures in a
realm in which pressures are most resisted and where conflicts are
most easily and most bitterly engendered." Justice Frankfurter
emphasized the role of public schools as "perhaps the most
powerful agency for promoting cohesion among a heterogeneous
democratic people" which required that public schools "keep
scrupulously free from entanglement in the strife of sects."'
In 1952, the Court seemingly departed from their strict
Establishment Clause jurisprudence in Zorach v. Clauson.85 Zorach
involved a New York City program which permitted students to be
released from public school during school hours to participate in
voluntary religious instruction by religious instructors.86 The Court
upheld the program as constitutional because neither religious
instruction in public schools nor the expenditure of public funds
were involved.87 Writing for the six-to-three majority, Justice
Douglas stated that while the separation between church and state
must remain "complete and unequivocal," as the program
involved neither religious instruction in public schools nor the
expenditure of public funds, the free exercise rights of those
participating students must be respected. 9  Justice Douglas
emphasized the paramount nature of religious freedom: "We are a
religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." 90
82. Id. at 210-11.
83. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 217 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
84. Id.
85. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
86. See id. at 306-8.
87. See id.
88. Id. at 312.
89. See id. at 313-15.
90. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313.
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A. Prayer in Public Schools
In 1962, the Supreme Court first addressed the
constitutionality of the long-standing practice of prayer in public
schools in Engel v. Vitale.91 In Engel, New York public school
students were led in a daily recitation of prayer, which was written
by school officials.' The policy permitted students who chose not
to participate to leave the room during the prayer.93 The Court, in
striking this practice down, cited discomfort with "prayer...
composed by governmental officials as part of a governmental
program to further religious belief."94  Justice Black's majority
opinion summarized the concerns over state participation in
religious activity such as prayer: "the constitutional prohibition
against laws respecting an establishment of religion must at least
mean that... it is not part of the business of the government to
compose official prayers for any group of the American people to
recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government. '
The Court noted that the prayer's observance was voluntary,
and while there was no evidence of compulsory or coercive student
participation, the Court held that "[t]he Establishment Clause,
unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any show-
ing of direct governmental compulsion," and was irrelevant to the
constitutionality of the prayer.96 The Court added, "... when the
power, prestige and financial support of government is placed
behind a particular religious belief, the indirect corrosive pressure
upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially
approved religion is plain."'
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart argued that the
threshold issue for such Establishment Clause cases should be a
positive showing of actual coercion of non-adherents, rather than a
potential or latent coercion.98  Steward argued that a strict
separationist Establishment Clause standard proposed by Engel
91. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
92. See id. at 422. The prayer adopted by the state Board of Regents, was as
follows: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg
Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country." Id.
93. See id.
94. Id. at 425.
95. Id. at 425. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion emphasized the role of a
"public official on the public payroll" in leading prayers "in a governmental
institution." Id. at 441 (Douglas, J., concurring).
96. Engel, 370 U.S. at 430.
97. Id. at 430-31.
98. See id. at 446. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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majority belied the complexity of interaction between state and
religious activity, and would invariably lead to conflict between
Free Exercise and Establishment concerns.'
In School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, the Court
struck down a Pennsylvania statute authorizing Bible reading in
public schools as an unconstitutional establishment of religion.' ° In
Schempp, Abingdon Senior High School began each morning with
a recitation over the public intercom system, followed by the Lord's
Prayer.01 In an eight-to-one decision, the Court held that the
practice of reading the Bible in Pennsylvania public schools was
akin to "the State conducting a religious exercise" and "employing
its facilities or funds in a way that gives any church, or all churches,
greater strength in our society than it would have by relying on its
members alone."'9 ' The Court rejected Pennsylvania's argument
that the exclusion of such religious practices in the schools equated
state hostility towards religion, and would serve to establish a
religion of secularism in the schools.9' The Court noted the vital
role of public school education in democracy, "0 and the importance
of strict state neutrality vis-A-vis religious sects:
Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the Bible
or religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular
program of education, may not be effected consistently with the
First Amendment, but the exercises here do not fall into those
categories. They are religious exercises required by the state in
violation of the command of the First Amendment that the
government maintain strict neutrality, neither aiding nor
imposing religion1
Justice Stewart again objected to the Court's reasoning in his
dissent.'" Citing concerns that without an actual showing of
99. See id.
100. Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). The
Pennsylvania statute stated: "At least then verses from the Holy Bible shall be
read without comment at the opening of each public school on each school day.
Any child shall be excused from such Bible reading, or attending such Bible
reading, upon the written request of his parent of guardian." Id. at 205 (citing 24
Pa. Stat. Section 15-1516, as amended, public law 1928).
101. See id. at 212.
102. Id. at 299 (Douglas, J., concurring).
103. See id. at 225.
104. See id. at 231 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The public school is at once the
symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for promoting our
common destiny.").
105. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225.
106. See id. at 308 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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coercion on non-adherent students, that the exclusion of religious
expression from the public school context placed religion at "an
artificial and state-created disadvantage," which would did not
advance "state neutrality, but rather as the establishment of a
religion of secularism. 10 7
These early cases make clear the fundamental principle of the
Establishment Clause: the state is barred from engaging in religious
exercise. The Court highlighted two primary areas of concern: the
role of public education in a democracy, and the potential coercive
effect of religious activities on young school-children. While an
actual showing of coercion need not be present for an
Establishment Clause challenge to be upheld by the Court,'0° it was
the role of public schools as "the symbol of our democracy" that
required their protection from the conducting of state religious
exercises in the schools."
B. Proponents Strike Back-Equal Access and Moments of Silence
In the years following Lemon v. Kurzman, the Court had
several opportunities to revisit the relationship between religion
and public schools. In 1981, the Court addressed the issue of
student religious activity in the public university setting in Widmar
v. Vincent.' In Widmar, the Court held that a "state university
which makes its facilities generally available for the activities of
registered student groups, may not close its facilities to a registered
student group desiring to use the facilities for religious worship and
religious discussion."''. While a university may still impose
reasonable time, place and manner restrictions, the Court held that
free speech and association grounds required that student religious
groups be given equal right of access to university facilities."
2
In 1990, the Court addressed the equal access of student
religious groups in the secondary school context in Board of
Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens.1' In
107. Id. at 313.
108. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 430. ("The Establishment Clause... does not
depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion.").
109. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 231 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see Schempp, 374
U.S. at 230 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Americans regard the public schools as a
most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of
government.").
110. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
111. Id. at 265.
112. See id. at 276.
113. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
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upholding the constitutionality of the 1984 Equal Access Act, the
Court held that secondary students' religious groups enjoy the same
right of access as other school groups."'
Justice O'Connor noted the "crucial difference between
government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment
Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the
Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.". 5  Allaying
concerns about the potential coercive effects on students,
O'Connor distinguished Mergens: "We think that secondary school
students are mature enough and are likely to understand that a
school does not endorse or support student speech that it merely
permits on a nondiscriminatory basis.' ' 6  She added: "The
proposition that schools do not endorse everything they fail to
censor is not complicated.""' 7
Though not dealing directly with prayer in public schools, the
Court's 1983 decision in Marsh v. Chambers addressed the
constitutionality of ceremonial prayer of legislative bodies."' In
Marsh, the practice of a state legislature opening legislative sessions
with prayer offered by a state-paid chaplain was held not to violate
the Establishment Clause."9 In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that
"opening sessions of legislative and other deliberate public bodies
with prayer is deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this
country.' 120 Rejecting a Lemon analysis and relying exclusively on
historical practices, the Marsh majority emphasized the fact that the
Framers "did not consider opening prayers as a proselytizing
activity or as a symbolically placing the government's official seal of
approval on one religious view.' 2' The Court held that "legislative
prayer presents no more potential for establishment" than other
114. See id. at 234-35.
115. Id. at 250.
116. Id.
117. Id. O'Connor highlighted both the role of the media and the findings of
Congress in addressing any potential coercive effect: "[P]articularly in this age of
massive media information ... the few years difference in age between high school
and college students [does not] justif[y] departing from Widmar. Indeed, we note
that Congress specifically rejected the argument that high school students are
likely to confuse an equal access policy with state sponsorship of religion:
'[S]tudents below the college level are capable of distinguishing between State-
initiated, school sponsored, or teacher-led religious speech on the one hand and
student-initiated, student-led religious speech on the other"'. Id. (inte.nal citations
omitted).
118. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
119. See id. at 783-5.
120. Id. at 786.
121. Id. at 792.
[Vol. 105:1
2000] THE JUDICIAL ASSAULT ON STUDENT-INITIATED PRAYER 113
types of government support of religious activity which the Court
had deemed constitutional, such as grants for higher education at
religious institutions or tax exemptions for religious organizations. 2
The Court revisited school prayer in Wallace v. Jaffree, where
an Alabama statute provided for a moment of silence for
meditation or prayer in public schools was held unconstitutional.123
The majority of the Court reasoned that the statute's stated
purpose, "for meditation or voluntary prayer" had a clear sectarian
purpose, violating the first prong of the Lemon test.124  The
legislative history revealed the "wholly religious nature of the
statute," and as such, the Court held that any statute intended to
encourage the expression of religious faith was constitutionally
suspect.12 The Court noted that concern regarding the government
enforcement of religious activity "has special force in the public
school context where attendance is mandatory," noting that the
"individual freedom of expression of conscience under the First
Amendment embraces the right to select any religious faith or none
at all.126  The Court concluded that the statute violated the
Establishment Clause because it "characterize[d] prayer as a
favored practice," resulting in the state endorsement of religion.27
Few manifestations of religious activity in public schools have
survived the rigors of modern Establishment Clause analysis. The
Supreme Court continues to apply broad Establishment Clause
principles of separation in order to avoid the appearance of
government-sponsorship of religious exercises, to protect the
continuing role of public schools as emissaries of democratic
principles, and assure the full and equal participation of all religious
minorities in the workings of government. It was against this
background that the Court considered the practice of official
prayers at public school graduation ceremonies in the 1992 case Lee
v. Weisman.
122. Id. at 791. The Court did, however, emphasize that adult legislators were
less subject to any potential coercive effect than school children. See id. at 792.
123. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
124. Id. at 56.
125. Id. at 56-60. The Court noted that the legislative history indicated an overt
effort on the part of Alabama lawmakers to "get prayer back into the schools." Id.
126. Id. at 52-3.
127. Id. at 60. However in concurring opinions, Justices Powell and O'Connor
suggested that under some circumstances, moment of silence statutes may be
constitutional. See id. at 62-84.
128. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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IV. Lee v. Weisman and the Subsequent Courts of Appeals
Debate
When I was a child, I spake as a child; when I became a man, I
put away childish things.
First Letter to the Corinthians, ch. 13, v.11.
The inclusion of prayers at secondary school graduation
ceremonies has a long and "widely established" pedigree in
American history. 9 Given the history of ceremonial prayers by
government officials, this is not surprising. However, the increasing
pluralism of the American education system and the increasing
sensitivity to the potential coercive effects of such activity on young
non-adherent children has called this practice into question, and the
Supreme Court addressed a challenge to it in 1992.
In Lee v. Weisman, the Supreme Court held that the practice of
a Connecticut public school to invite a local rabbi to lead a religious
invocation and benediction at a graduation ceremony was uncon-
stitutional under the Establishment Clause. 3' Pursuant to a long-
standing school policy, the principal of the Nathan Bishop Middle
School invited Rabbi Leslie Gutterman to speak at the ceremony,
and provided him with a school-endorsed letter outlining the
guidelines for public prayers at non-sectarian civic ceremonies. "'
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Blackmun, O'Connor,
Souter and Stevens, held that the practice of school officials
choosing and sponsoring an invocation at a public high school
129. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia, in discussing the prevalence
of graduation prayers in American history, cited the example of the graduation
ceremony of the first public high school in America, in Connecticut in 1868: "15
seniors from the Norwich Academy marched in their best Sunday suits and dresses
into a church hall and waited through majestic music and long prayers." Id.
130. See id. at 577-80.
131. See id. at 581. Rabbi Gutterman's invocation prayer was as follows:
"God of the Free, Hope of the Brave: For the legacy of America where
diversity is celebrated and the rights of minorities are protected, we thank
You. May these young men and women grow up to enrich it. For the
liberty of America, we thank You. May these new graduates grow up to
guard it. For the political process of America in which all its citizens may
participate, for its court system where all may seek justice, we thank You.
May those we honor this morning always turn to it in trust. For the
destiny of America, we thank You. May the graduates of Nathan Bishop
Middle School so live that they might help share it. May our aspirations
for our country and for these young people, who are our hope for the
future, be richly fulfilled. Amen."
Id. at 582.
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graduation ceremony violated the Establishment Clause because of
excessive state involvement and the potential coercive effect on
non-adherents.32 Justice Kennedy's majority opinion explicitly
stated several "dominant facts" which led to the appearance of
state-sponsorship, including sponsorship of the event, the close
control exercised by school officials over the ceremony, and the fact
that attendance, though voluntary, was "in a fair and real sense
obligatory."'33 This combination led the Court to conclude that the
inclusion of prayer at such a ceremony was tantamount to state-
sponsorship of religious expression: "State officials direct the
performance of a formal religious exercise at promotional and
graduation ceremonies for secondary schools.""'3 The Court found
that the "government involvement with religious activity" in Lee
"pervasive."135
Rejecting the contention that such ceremonial prayers at civic
events were more akin to the legislative prayers of Marsh v.
Chambers, Justice Kennedy determined that the appropriate
analogy was to "the classroom setting, where we have said the risk
of compulsion is especially high.' 3 6 The Court, recognizing that in
American society, high school graduation is viewed as "one of life's
most significant occasions, '""' considered attendance at the cere-
monies "obligatory," in that a student who felt compelled to absent
herself from graduation ceremonies would forfeit "those intangible
benefits which have motivated the student through youth and all
her high school years.'
138
Finding the degree of state involvement "troubling," Justice
Kennedy focused on the coercive nature of the religious expression:
"The principle that government may accommodate the free
exercise of religion does not supercede the fundamental
limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause. It is beyond
dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in
religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which
'established a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do
132. See id. at 599.
133. Lee, 505 U.S. at 586.
134. Id. at 586.
135. Id. at 587.
136. Id. at 596.
137. Id. at 595.
138. Lee, 505 U.S. at 595.
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so.' The state's involvement in the school prayers challenged
today violates these central principles. '" 9
Kennedy noted that the age of the participants affected the
Court's coercion analysis: "there are heightened concerns with
protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in
the elementary and secondary public schools."'
Kennedy also declared that the activity challenged in Lee did
not violate student's First Amendment Free Exercise rights,
reserved instead for private expression needing no support by the
state: "The First Amendment's Religion Clauses mean that
religious beliefs and religious expression are too precious to be
either proscribed or prescribed by the State.'
41
A. Graduation Prayer since Lee v. Weisman
Following the Supreme Court's 1992 Lee v. Weisman decision,
school districts across the country have attempted to craft new
school policies governing invocations at graduation ceremonies.
The goals of such policies have been both to conform to the
existing law, and to allow students and their communities to give
expression to those religious traditions which have long been an
element in public graduations and community celebrations.
Generally, these policies attempt to divorce prayers or religious
invocations at public graduation ceremonies from the imprint of the
state, i.e. any direct involvement by the school or official in
determining the content of such messages. In doing so, the
responsibility for the content and delivery of such messages is
placed upon student representatives of the graduating class.
Since Lee, several Federal Courts of Appeals have heard
challenges to such practices, with a variety of results. One of the
first challenges to student-led graduation prayers to reach the
federal Court of Appeals was heard by the Fifth Circuit in Jones v.
139. Id. at 587 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678). Both Justices Blackmun and
Souter, in concurring opinions, cited the continuing relevance of the Lemon test,
and stressed the fact that a finding of coercion was not required for an
Establishment Clause violation. See id. at 606 (Blackmun, J., concurring), and 618-
20 (Souter, J., concurring). In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by
Justices Rehnquist, Thomas, and White, criticized the Court's coercion test as a
"boundless, and boundlessly manipulable" test, grounded more in "psychology
practiced by amateurs" than in historical precedent and practice. See id. at 577
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 592.
141. Id. at 589.
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Clear Creek Independent School District.'42 In Jones, the Clear
Creek School District adopted a policy which established guidelines
for invocations and benedictions at high school graduation
ceremonies, and permitted high school students to elect student
volunteers to deliver "nonsectarian, nonproselytizing" invocations
and benedictions at their graduation ceremonies.
In affirming a lower court judgment denying injunctive and
declarative relief, the Fifth Circuit distinguished Jones from Lee by
stating that student-led, voluntary prayer is distinguishable from
school-directed prayer led by clergy, as found in Lee.' The court
found that the unconstitutional "coercion" found in Lee was absent
in Jones based upon three factors of the school's policy: 1.) the
decision of the inclusion of prayers was delegated to students, with
no state involvement; 2.) only student volunteers could lead the
invocation, not school officials or clergy; and 3.) prayers must be
nonsectarian and non-proselytizing, unlike the detailed guidelines
provided to the rabbi by the principal.' The court stated:
"[G]raduation prayers... place less psychological pressure on
students that the prayers at issue in Lee because all students, after
having participated in the decision of whether prayers will be given,
are aware that any prayers represent the will of their peers, who are
less able to coerce participation than an authority figure from the
state or clergy. '46
Applying the Lemon test, the Court of Appeals held that
student-led nonsectarian, nonproselytizing graduation prayers have
the secular purpose of solemnization of the ceremony,' 7 do not
advance religion, nor excessively entangle the state with religion."
Additionally, the mere inclusion of religious speech in the
graduation ceremony is not of itself dispositive of an uncon-
stitutional state endorsement of religion.49
142. 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992).
143. Id. at 964.
144. See id. at 969-71.
145. See id.
146. Id. at 971. Dispelling concerns of the potential coercive nature of student-
led invocations on non-adherents, the court relied on Justice O'Connor's language
in Mergens: "We think that secondary school students are mature enough and are
likely to understand that a school does not endorse or support student speech that
it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis." Id. at 969 (quoting Mergens, 496
U.S. at 250).
147. See Jones, 977 F.2d at 966 ("... solemnization is a legitimate secular
purpose of ceremonial prayer.").
148. See id. at 966.
149. See id. To this end, the court quoted Justice O'Connor in Mergens: "There
is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the
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In the 1994 case Harris v. Joint School District, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals struck down a similar practice of an Idaho
public school's policy of student-led invocations in public
graduation ceremonies.'5°  In Harris, an Idaho public school
adopted a policy of allowing the graduating class to vote whether to
include an invocation at graduation ceremonies, and whether the
invocation should be led by a student or clergy.' The school also
included a disclaimer in the commencement program of the
school's endorsement of the remarks of the ceremony's speakers.'52
Analyzing the case using both the Lemon test and Weisman,
the Ninth Circuit held that despite the lack of direct school
supervision or control over the selection or remarks of the student
speakers, sufficient state involvement existed to create the
impression of unconstitutional state-sponsorship of religion.'53
Factors of state sponsorship cited by the Court include: ultimate
school official control over all other aspects of the ceremony, school
financial sponsorship of the event, and that the event occurs on
school property.54 The court held that control over all aspects of
the ceremony was at all time vested in school officials, in spite of
the delegation of particular aspects of the ceremony to students,
does not absolve the school of its constitutional obligations:
"Elected officials cannot avoid constitutional mandates by putting
them to a majority vote.
' 55
Once the court determined that the event was controlled by
the state, in spite of limited student participation and decision-
making concerning invocations, the practice failed both a Lee
coercion analysis, and Lemon entanglement and secular purpose
analysis. 56 The court ruled that the coercive effect of the student-
led prayers were "indistinguishable" from the clergy-led prayers in
Weisman.'57 The court also held that the Free Speech and Free
Exercise rights of the students were not compromised, as the
graduation ceremony did not involve an open public forum.'58
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the
Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect." Id. at 969 (quoting Mergens, 496
U.S. at 250).
150. Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist, 41 F.3d 447, 452 (9th Cir. 1994).
151. See id. at 452.
152. See id. at 453.
153. See id. at 452.
154. See id. at 454-56.
155. Harris, 41 F.3d at 455.
156. See id. at 457.
157. Id. at 457.
-158. See id. at 458. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Harris, vacated the
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In American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. Black
Horse Pike Regional School Board, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals heard a challenge to a New Jersey school board practice
which similarly placed the responsibility for the inclusion of an
opening invocation with the graduating students.9 In response to
the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Lee v. Weisman, and the Fifth
Circuit's Jones v. Clear Creek decision, the Black Horse Pike school
district had adopted a policy permitting graduating seniors to vote
on the inclusion of a student-led prayer or moment of silence in the
graduation ceremonies.1" A plurality of students voted to include
prayer."' In Black Horse, the Third Circuit struck down the
challenged practice, determining that the school official control and
state-sponsorship present in Black Horse were indistinguishable
from Lee.
162
In ruling the policy unconstitutional, the Third Circuit majority
found the reasoning of Harris more persuasive than that of Jones.163
The court held that regardless of the degree of participation on the
part of students and student-elected speakers, the graduation
ceremony necessarily remained a state-sponsored and controlled
event, bearing the indelible imprint of the state.'6 The nature and
degree of student participation was also deemed irrelevant: "An
impermissible practice can not be transformed into a constitu-
tionally acceptable one by putting a democratic process to an
improper use. 165
The court found that the policy also violated the coercion test
of Lee. The de facto obligatory attendance required of students, as
expressed in Lee, together with the inability to express objection to
the prayers, resulted in the coerced participation of non-adherent
judgment, and remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot. See Harris v. Joint
Sch. Dist., 41 F.3d 447, 452 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted; vacated and remanded,
515 U.S. 1154 (1995).
159. ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg. Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3rd Cir.
1996). The students were given the choice whether to have prayer, a moment of
silence, or nothing during the graduation ceremony. See id. at 1475.
160. See id. at 1471.
161. 128 students voted for prayer, 120 for moment of silence, and 20 for
neither. See id. at 1475.
162. See id. at 1480 ("The control exercised by state officials here, though
different in degree than was present in Lee, is not sufficiently distinct to require a
different result.").
163. See id. at 1482-83.
164. See Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1479 ("Delegation of one aspect of the
ceremony to a plurality of the students does not constitute an absence of school
officials' control over the graduation.").
165. Id. at 1477.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
students.' 66 Examining the practice under the traditional Lemon
test, the court found that the practice violated both the secular
purpose and endorsement prongs, by the policy's explicit and
exclusive purpose of religious expression.
While commenting upon the sensitive nature of the subject of
religion and personal expression involved in the case," the Court
ultimately placed great weight upon the state's obligation to protect
the religious beliefs and expression of all citizens, not only those of
the majority:
Whatever accommodation may require, it is clear that
government neutrality toward religion still is the hallmark of the
Religion Clauses ... [the school's policy] can not be justified as
an accommodation because it seeks to accommodate the
preference of some at the expense of others and thereby crosses
the required line of neutrality. 169
The Court explicitly rejected the argument that the Free
Speech rights of the student participants trumped Establishment
Clause concerns: "The First Amendment... gives no one the right
to insist that in pursuit of their own interests others must conform
their conduct to his own religious necessities."'7
In Adler v. Duval County School Board, the Eleventh Circuit
ruled unconstitutional a Florida school district's policy of per-
mitting students to decide by majority vote whether to include
unrestricted invocations and benedictions by student represent-
atives at graduation ceremonies.'71 In response to Lee v. Weisman,
the Duval County school district issued a policy to school officials
outlining guidelines for prayers at graduation ceremonies.' The
guidelines included: a.) the message was not to exceed two minutes,
b.) student representatives were to be selected by the graduating
class, and c.) the content of the student messages was not to be
monitored or reviewed by any school officials.' At graduation
ceremonies in Duval County, ten of the seventeen schools had
166. See id.
167. See id. at 1487-88. The court rejected the argument that the prayer's
primary purpose was that of "solemnization." See id.
168. See id. at 1488 ("Issues of religion touch litigants and interested observers
of the law as few other issues can.").
169. Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1488 (quoting Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,
472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985)).
170. Id. at 1488 (quoting Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. at 710).
171. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 174 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 1999).
172. See id. at 1236.
173. See id.
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student speeches with prayers or religious content, and seven
schools gave secular messages."'
The Eleventh Circuit reversed a District Court denial of
injunctive relief, ruling the practice of Duval County schools
unconstitutional. Applying first the Weisman analysis, the court
found that despite delegation of the responsibility of one aspect of
the ceremony to students, the state still held "tremendous control
over the graduation ceremonies." '175 Factors cited included: the
renting of the facilities for the ceremony, telling the students what
to wear and when to sit and stand, control over the sequence of
events at the ceremony, and the printing of the official ceremony
programs.176 The court, in citing the Third Circuit's Black Horse
decision, stated that control over the event is not ceded by the state,
merely because officials "agreed to let [students] decide that one
question.
' 17
The court was especially critical of the school's attempts (in the
court's estimation) to circumvent the central holding of Lee v.
Weisman: "[W]e find that the school system believed it could give a
'wink and a nod' to controlling Establishment Clause jurisprudence
through attempting to delegate to the majority/plurality vote of
students what it could not do on its own-permit and sponsor
sectarian and proselytizing prayer at graduation ceremonies.'
178
The policy failed under Weisman's coercion analysis, as well.79
The court held that the obligatory nature of attendance at a "once-
in-a-lifetime" ceremony,"8 together with the school's requirement
of non-participating students to stand or remain silent during the
prayer was an impermissible act of coercion by the school. 8' The
court also found a coercive element within the school's student
speaker election policy: "because the graduation speaker.. . won
an elective contest to speak, the audience is much more aware that
the views expressed are those of the majority, and ... the audience
faces even greater compulsion to participate. 1 2 The court held the
practice unconstitutional under a Lemon analysis, also."3
174. See id. at 1240.
175. Id. at 1244.
176. See Alder, 174 F.3d at 1244.
177. Id. (quoting Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1479).
17& Id. at 1246.
179. See id. at 1248.
180. Alder, 174 F.3d at 1248 (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 596).
181. See id.
182. Id.
183. See id. at 1249-1251.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
V. Searching for an Acceptable Policy
It is error alone which needs support of government. Truth can
stand by itself.
Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Tyler
Wading through the morass of Courts of Appeals decisions on
student-initiated, student-led invocations at public school gradua-
tion ceremonies is an arduous process for any legal observer,
especially for those school districts seeking to bring their policies
into conformity with existing law. Unfortunately, each time the
Supreme Court has been given the opportunity to rule on such a
practice, it has denied certiorari to those cases or remanded without
comment. Thus, school officials are left with conflicting and
seemingly contradictory Court of Appeals decisions to guide their
policy-making process.
A. Surviving a Weisman Analysis
The Courts of Appeals decisions make it clear that both a
Lemon and Weisman analysis are to be applied in cases involving
student prayer at graduation ceremonies, however, the courts begin
their discussion with the Weisman test for coercion. The Fifth
Circuit sets out the Weisman test as a three-part analysis: "Lee
identifies unconstitutional coercion when (1) the government
directs (2) a formal religious exercise (3) in such a way as to
obligate the objector to participate.' ' 184
Any policy must satisfy the courts that the state does not
control or direct religious expression. The courts recognize that
absolute separation is impossible.185 The issue becomes whether the
state's involvement exceeds a permissible tolerance of student
expression and becomes the intentional control of an overtly
religious exercise.
184. Jones, 977 F.2d at 970. The finding of a formal religious exercise by the
courts is dependent upon the finding of state control. Where excessive state
control is found, that issue is dispositive of an impermissible practice, and as such,
is determined to be akin to a formal state-sponsored religious exercise. Where the
requisite elements of state control and sponsorship are lacking, however, there
seems to be no issue of religious exercise. See id. at 971.
185. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614 ("[O]ur prior holdings do not call for total
separation between church and state; total separation is not possible in an absolute
sense.., some relationship between government and religious organizations is
inevitable").
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While some courts take a strict view of state control over the
ceremony as requiring the conclusion that all activity occurring
during the ceremony to be state-controlled,"8 most recognize that
the nature of graduation ceremonies requires extensive state
involvement. However, the dispositive issue for the courts is





Much of the controversy among the Courts of Appeals
centered on the selection process for student speakers. In most
cases where challenged policies were ruled unconstitutional, the
selection of student representatives was determined by majoritarian
vote. While the Fifth Circuit argued that a democratic election of
representatives was itself a neutral selection process, the Third and
Ninth Circuits strongly objected to the practice."
However, Lee provides insight into a potentially permissible
mechanism of determining student representatives. In his con-
curring opinion, Justice Souter distinguished Lee from a hypo-
thetical policy that presumably would satisfy the Constitution: "If
the State had chosen its graduation day speakers according to
wholly secular criteria, and if one of those speakers (not a state
actor) had individually chosen to deliver a religious message, it
would have been harder to attribute an endorsement of religion to
the State." '189
Thus, were a school district policy to select student
representatives on the basis on wholly secular and independent
criteria, such as class rank, it is doubtful that the courts would find
this as an element of school control. This approach is consistent
with Justice Souter's comments, and the discussions of the Courts
of Appeals decision.
Concerning the content of the student's invocation, the Jones
court placed emphasis on the "nonsectarian and nonproselytizing"
nature in upholding the constitutionality of the prayer." This
content restriction was viewed as a means of ensuring a secular
purpose of solemnization and of reducing the potential coercive
effect on non-adherents."' The Eleventh Circuit also commented
186. See the Third Circuit's restrictive interpretation of such activity in Black
Horse, supra n.157.
187. See Jones, 977 F.2d at 970-71.
188. See Jones, 977 F.2d at 969; Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1477; Harris, 41 F.3d at
455.
189. Lee, 505 U.S. at 630 n.8 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter was joined
in his concurrence by Justices Stevens and O'Connor.
190. See Jones, 977 F.2d at 967.
191. See id.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
on a lack of such restrictions in striking down the Adler policy as
contributing to the coercive effect of such prayers."
School officials are faced with a quandary concerning content:
limit and review the content of the speaker's invocations to assure
their nonsectarian nature, and one may argue that this represents
an additional degree of state control over the speech and ceremony;
fail to restrict such content, however, and the school runs the risk of
having the policy struck down for the potential coercive effect of
sectarian prayers. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits notwithstanding,
it seems a more reasonable argument that restricting the content of
such speeches would evidence de facto impermissible state control
or sponsorship and is not constitutionally required when the
speakers are chosen based on secular criteria. It is the better to
avoid such content-sensitive policies.
Additionally, the courts do not recognize disclaimers as an
effective measure acknowledging non-endorsement. The dis-
positive issues center around state control: if state control is found,
no manner of disclaimer will keep the courts from declaring the
policy unconstitutional. Having said that, however, while not yet
deemed dispositive, a court lacking other means to strike down a
policy as unconstitutional may use the absence of a disclaimer to
rule a practice unconstitutional. As such, the inclusion of a
disclaimer can only serve to strengthen the concept of the state's
non-sponsorship.
The final element of Weisman's coercion test is whether non-
adherents or objectors in attendance are obligated to participate in
the invocation. The Lee majority pointedly discusses the coercive
potential of majoritarian invocations:
The undeniable fact is that the school district's supervision and
control of a high school graduation ceremony places public
pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students to stand
as a group or, at least, maintain respectful silence during the
invocation and benediction. This pressure, though subtle and
indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion... But for the
dissenter of high school age, who has a reasonable perception
that she is being forced by the State to pray in a manner her
conscience will not allow, the injury is no less real.' 93
No court questions the Supreme Court's understanding that,
though technically voluntary, graduation ceremonies represent a
"once-in-a-lifetime" event for students, and that in every sense
192. See Adler, 174 F.3d at 1247-48.
193. Lee, 505 U.S. at 593.
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participation is "obligatory." '194 Two factors influence a finding of
coercive participation: 1.) the age of those involved, and 2.) the
manifestations of required participation. Concerning age and
maturity levels of high school students, Justice O'Connor's
comments in Mergens notwithstanding,' 9 the Courts of Appeals
recognize that coercive potential on 18-year old high school
students still exists in a graduation setting. 96
Great emphasis is placed on the condition at many ceremonies
that those not participating in the invocation are nevertheless
required to stand or remain silent, with no recourse or outlet for
opposition." While the Fifth Circuit felt that such ceremonial
prayers were akin to the harmless "God save the United States and
this Honorable Court" invocation at the beginning of
SupremeCourt sessions,98 other courts believe these manifestations
of obliged participation to be sufficient in themselves for a policy to
be ruled unconstitutionally coercive.
This standard is also unclear. It seems, however, that the
coerced participation prong rests upon a finding of pressure to
participate in the abstract rather than on any actual participation.
In order to avoid the appearance of obliged participation by non-
adherents, school district policies must nowhere state, nor the
speakers request, that those in attendance participate by standing,
remaining silent, or otherwise manifesting any required behavior.
While some courts may nevertheless find a potential for coercion, it
is difficult to see how where absolutely no behavior or participation
is required of any in attendance, that a non-adherent would be
coerced into behavior objectionable to himself or herself.
B. Surviving a Lemon Analysis
To survive constitutional scrutiny, graduation prayer must
satisfy the three familiar elements of the Lemon test: the challenged
practice must (1) reflect a secular purpose; (2) have the primary
effect of neither advancing nor inhibiting religion; and (3) avoid
excessive governmental entanglement with religion. 20" For most
194. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 596; Adler, 174 F.3d at 1248.
195. See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250 ("We think that secondary school students
are mature enough and are likely to understand that a school does not endorse or
support student speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis.").
196. See Adler, 174 U.S. at 1248.
197. See Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1477.
198. See Jones, 977 F.2d at 971-72.
199. See Adler, 174 F.3d at 1248.
200. While the Supreme Court in Lee v. Weisman did not subject the invocation
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courts as they confront the issue of student prayer at graduation
ceremonies, the threshold issue is the secular purpose prong.
The court may determine if the policy has a secular purpose in
two ways: 1.) by the plain language of the policy itself, and 2.) by
any legislative history available to the court." While most policies
don't explicitly state that the purpose of the policy is for the
expression of prayer, and as such are facially-neutral, the actions of
school officials in the formulation and adoption of policies are
carefully scrutinized by the courts, whether in the form of school
memoranda, deliberations by school officials, advice of legal
counsel, or minutes of school board meetings.
Where the stated purpose of such policies is to permit .the
inclusion of prayer in ceremonies, the policy will likely fail Lemon's
secular purpose prong. As such, where a school adopts a policy of
student-led invocations, school officials should not overtly discuss
any intentions of adopting a new policy for the express purpose of
religious expression at a school-sponsored event. It may be
discussed as one of many permissible activities by the student
speakers among a variety of potential student expression, such as
poems, speeches, silence or interpretive dance. But where school
officials make explicit mention of the purpose of prayer, a court
may discern a sectarian purpose, and an Establishment Clause
violation.
Concerning the other elements of the Lemon test, the
resolution of the secular purpose prong is often dispositive of both
the primary effects prong, and the endorsement prong. No
graduation prayer case has failed after satisfying the secular
purpose prong.
VI. Conclusion
The Americans combine the notions of Christianity and of liberty
so intimately in their minds that it is impossible to make them
conceive the one without the other.
Alexis deTocqueville, Democracy in America.
practice to a Lemon analysis, the Courts of Appeals all apply Lemon.
201. See Adler, 174 F.3d at 1249-50.
202. See id. at 1239-41. In Adler, the court introduced evidence of a sectarian
purpose by school officials in the form of school board meeting minutes, and
letters by officials to community religious leaders discussing ways to "'fish' for
ways to incorporate prayer in our graduation ceremonies." Id. at 1239 n.2
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Few subjects engender the fervor and intensity of controversy
as does the subject of religion in the public square. This
controversy intensifies when the subject involves religion in public
schools and its effect on schoolchildren.
The Constitution guarantees that no citizen may have the
religious beliefs of others imposed upon him by the machinery of
the state. It also guarantees that each citizen may enjoy the full
expression of those religious beliefs without interference from the
state. Yet the Supreme Court struggles to define a workable and
predictable standard by which to judge such controversies. The
Court admits that that Establishment Clause jurisprudence is
"delicate and fact-sensitive, ' 2°3 and that "every government practice
must be judged in its unique circumstances.
204
In Lee v. Weisman, the Supreme Court stated that "the First
Amendment does not allow the government to stifle prayers," and
that "religious beliefs and religious expression are too precious to
be either proscribed or prescribed by the State., 205 The Court
recognized that situations may arise in which "religious values,
religious practices, and religious persons will have some interaction
with the public schools and their students." 26 When such situations
arise, the Court expressly warned that "[a] relentless and all-
pervasive attempt to exclude religion from every aspect of public
life could itself become inconsistent with the Constitution. '' 20 This
may be where we now find ourselves.
Religious expression remains a dominant influence in
contemporary American culture, and has played an integral role in
our nation's history. The rights of adherents to religious groups
have long been recognized by our government. As Justice Kennedy
stated in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, "Government policies of
accommodation, acknowledgment, and support for religion are an
accepted part of our political and cultural heritage. ' '2' The
Constitution, the Supreme Court's precedents, and our traditions
demand that government accord religious speech, religious people,
and religious organizations at least the same treatment as their
secular counterparts. To exclude religious expression from the
public square would be antithetical to the intentions of the
Founders and the purposes of the Religion Clauses. As Professor
203. Lee, 505 U.S. at 597.
204. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 694 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
205. Id. at 589.
206. Id. at 598-99.
207. Id.
208. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 657. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Stephen Carter stated: "Religious groups are of special value to a
democracy, and the state should nurture them rather than reject
them."2 °9
In spite of its lip service to these concerns, the Court has
adopted a piecemeal approach to its Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. As a result, both the lower courts and court
observers are trapped in a kind of constitutional straightjacket -
unsure of how to move forward, and not given the theoretical tools
to do so. In the Courts of Appeals, differing standards, tests and
results arise from the controversy surrounding student-initiated
prayer at graduation ceremonies. School officials are left to guess
at what policies are constitutionally acceptable. Not only is this
situation undesirable, it is unacceptable.
Scott W. Brady
209. Stephen Carter, The Resurrection of Religious Freedom?, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 118, 136 (1993).
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